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FILED
GERARD CRUZ,
Case DM0554-14
CARMELITA CRUZ,
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM
Plaintiff,
Defendant.
INTRODUCTION This matter came before the Honorable Alberto
Lamorena, Ill September
for hearing Defendant Carmelita Cruz’s (“Carmelita”) Motion for Reconsideration. Attorney James Maher appeared behalf of Plaintiff Gerard Crnz (“Gerard”). Attorney Nicole Cruz
appeared behalf of Carmelita. Having heard the arguments testimony of parties
considered the applicable law, Court now issues Decision Order Carmelita’s Motion for Reconsideration.
DENJES
This action arose Dissolution of Marriage (Sept. appeared before the Court regarding distribution of spousal support. Thereafter,
divorce complaint filed September 2014. Compl. for 2014). The parties eventually settled their divorce and September 2015, announcing terms of agreement
BACKGROUND
DECISION ORDER
community assets, community debts
parties executed Stipulated Interlocutory Decree for Divorce,
fr
obligations,
2019
RT
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and
Cruz
Cruz
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which subsequently approved Court (“Interlocutory Decree”)
November
Stipulated Interlocutory Interlocutory Decree,
memorialized of reached Judgment
granted issued
incorporating
Interlocutory Judgment
community
Interlocutory
inherited
accordance Corporation (PfC)
of
Interlocutory
following
Carmelita brought willfully violated of
Carmelita Contempt
Defendant’s Motion
denying Interlocutory
willfully
Gerard essentially Opposition
Carmelita
Carmelita
Reconsideration, arguing
committed Reconsideration
Interlocutory obligations,
Divorce comprised of three
community Pursuant
(feb. Carmelita
consider PfC
of
Interlocutory
Carmelita would
alleging
Interlocutory
Decision
property opposition,
of
inability
Defendant’s
resolved Reconsider (“Opposition”)
manifestly Carmelita further
Defendant’s
separate
3245-New-REM-l-5, Municipality
February
Decision Order DM0554-14,
was
Decree for Divorce
by the
on 24, 2015. (Nov. 24, 2015). The
the terms adultery. Id. A Final
by the parties, and Decree for Divorce was
which a divorce on grounds of
the Decree. Final
and Decree for
the same day, (Nov. 24, 2015).
The
debts and
Decree is
and spousal support.
sections: property,
the first section the
The parties also agreed that
the settlement
Decree at 2-4.
Decree, the parties agreed to sell the marital home. Id. at
to
keep, as her property, the land she had from her family: Lot 3245-NEW-REM-]-5, Chalan Pago. Id. at 2.
In with Section II the Decree, including a “Personal Finance
personal loan secured by Lot No.
Chalan Pago, Guam in the amount of $1,180 per month” (“PFC Loan”). Id.
of
(“Motion”) at fact that
21, 2019). lost her
the loan. Id. has not met her burden in her motion and
a Motion for Order to Show the terms the Decree, for Order to Show Cause & (Jan. 29, 2018). The Court issued a Decision and Order on 11, 2019,
a failure to pay the PFC loan, Cause and Contempt, Gerard
causing to lose her property.
the motions and finding that Gerard did not Decree. & Order (Feb. 11, 2019).
violate the terms of the
filed her Motion for in issuing its Decision which was
the Court Motion for
clear error
filed an
to Motion to
at 5-7 (Apr. 23, 2019).
as a result
Gerard’s to pay the
unjust.
argues that the Court failed to
arguing
attempts to improperly relitigate the issues by the Court. Plaintiff’s
Page2oflO
I
H
Decision and Order DMO554-4, Cruz
Cruz
4 11,
in
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at 6
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Carmelita filed Reply, arguing while the Court found that Gerard did not willfully violate the Interlocutory Decree, the Court failed provide remedy to Carmelita. Reply at
The Court held hearing on September 20, 2019, during which the Court heard testimony. Minute Entry (Sept. 20, 2019). The Court ordered the parties to provide supplemental briefing. Carmelita submitted supplemental brief, putting forth deeds, mortgage documents, and other documents showing the property in questiofis Carmelita’s sole property. Defendant’s Supplemental Breif [sic] Support of Motion Reconsideration (“Supplemental Brief’) (Sept. 24, 2019). Gerard filed supplemental opposition, arguing there
no basis law or fact for the Court reconsider its prior order. Plaintiff’s Response Defendant’s Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration (“Supplemental Opposition”) (Oct. 4, 2019). Carmelita filed supplemental reply, arguing the Interlocutory Decree has led to gross inequity. Defendant Carmelita Cruz’s Reply Plaintiff Gerard Cruz’s Supplemental Brief Support of Motion for Reconsideration (“Supplemental Reply”) 2-
(Oct. 2019). Having heard the testimony and arguments of the parties and reviewed the supplemental briefs, the Court took the matter under advisement. Minute Entry (Sept. 20, 2019).
DISCUSSION
Preliminarily, the Court has already ruled on the issue of attorney’s fees. Carmelita
asserts that “the request for attorney’s fees CARMELITA’s reply hasn’t been addressed.” Motion at The Court denied Carmelita’s Motion for Contempt its entirety. Decision Order at As such, any relief sought pursuant to the Motion for Contempt has been denied and resolved. Carmelita also alleges that the other request money judgment raised her Reply has not been addressed. Motion at The Court disagrees. As the Motion for Contempt was denied
whole, all relief sought during the pendency of that Motion was denied.
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v.
– to
Decision Order DM0554- Crur
.
2016 Guam 2$
14.
new
an
Dist. No.
clear
or the law.”
A motion for the on any of:
be made oniy on the
(1) a material such
in fact or law from that
to the Court
not have been
to the (2) the
for at the time new material facts or a change
or,
such law
the to the
time such (3) a
a failure to
facts
before such decision. 7.1(i). No motion for
shall in any to the
any oral or written Estctte
made in
or in
allows a to be used
Ctv. to
ACandS, Inc., and
a order” and
is an of
for (2)
are
where the trial court: “(1) is with was or; (3) if there is Reyes, 199$ 10 Sch. F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993)). A motion to
Inc. v Estctte her
in the interests
Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000).
was unjclst lost
“it
to
as a of
to meet his the basis of her
at 5.
to
further
that in the
in
arguing that the
11, 2019 and and address the material fact that
(2) and (3) 7. 1(i), “in material facts before and the Reply at
to
will
the same value
to the 2012 PFC Loan.” that she the and failure
gmunds
CVR argument
reconsideration support of opposition
original
manner repeat motion. Lujan
of Rosario,
decision
known party moving
reconsideration of of
decision, occurring after
Court
¶ Motions
reconsideration appropriate committed error decision
presented
emergence of of decision,
reconsideration of decision motion may
difference
presented before exercise of reasonable diligence could
manifest showing of
consider material
presented
evidence;
intervening change controlling Ward
manifestly unjust,
reconsider remedy, Kona Enters.,
court sparingly
“reconsider
amend
of finality
previous but conservation
“extraordinary judicial resources.”
IJ, Muttnomah
Carmelita brings Order manifestly
of Motion,
Court’s February failed consider
Decision
because
CARMELITA approximately $88,500.00 while GERARD benefit
of
$88,500.00 result GERARD’S failure
obligation motion, explaining
Motion Carmelita motion pursuant subsections
clarifies
brings
consider
after
of CVR decision.”
reference emergence
Guam
¶
(quoting
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14 v.
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23
25
77
28
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1.
v.
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II
‘7
20
74
26
and
14, Crttz
‘. 5
Page of
3
5
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1
e
that error.
A. Carmelita has not demonstrated the Court committed clear
Carmelita asserts the Court committed clear error in two ways. First, Carmelita argues the Court distributed her separate property to Gerard. Second, Carmelita argues the Court has re-written the parties’ settlement agreement. As explained below, both of these arguments fail,
and the Court finds that Carmelita has not demonstrated that the Court committed clear error. The Court did not distribute Carmelita’s separate property.
Carmelita argues that the Court’s prior order distributes her separate property to Gerard but offers no legal explanation for how this true. Reply at Carmelita repeatedly argues that her losing the property result of the loan default constitutes distribution of property by the Court. Over and over again, Carmelita offers this argument but cites no law in support of this assertion.
The Court, in the Interlocutory Decree, did not distribute Carmelita’s property to Gerard. The language clearly indicates that Carmelita to keep to her separate property, clearly indicating that the Court did not distribute this property to Gerard. Interlocutory Decree
The Court does not find that any of the language, either explicitly or implicitly, distributed Carmelita’s property Gerard.
The Interlocutory Decree provides that Gerard shall be responsible for the Personal Finance Corporation (PFC) Personal Loan secured by Carmelita’s property question. Interlocutory Decree at What Carmelita leaves out of her briefs that Carmelita agreed to have the loan secured by her property: “The Parties, having reached full and complete agreement resolving the issues arising out of the action for the divorce filed herein, and having incorporated the ctgreed upon terms and conditions into the Stipulated Interlocutory Decree set forth herein below Interlocutory Decree at (emphasis added). Carmelita
.
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Page 10
Decision and Order DM0554-14, Crttz Cruz
1.
to
all all
as a
a
3.
is
.“
is
2.
is
of
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in
at 2.
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8
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12
13 14 IS 16 17 18 19
20
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22
23
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v.
14,
Page 6 1C)
.
e
.
Carmelita not that Court erred interpreting Interlocutory
Ci-u
cannot rightly agree to such a condition and then claim such a term constitutes distribution of her property. Carmelita, having been represented by counsel at the time of the agreement, is bound to the terms of her agreement. is not relevant to this analysis that Carmelita has lost the property in question; while the property may have been lost, it was not due to distribution by the Court.
As such, the Court finds it did not distribute Carmelita’s separate property.
has sufficiently shown the clearly in
Section II(A)(2) of the Decree.
Carmelita argues that the Court re-writes the parties’ settlement agreement when it interpreted Section II(A)(2) of the Interlocutory Decree to read that section as “requiring GERARD to make only minimum payment of $1,180.00.” Motion at Throughout the four briefs submitted to the Court, Carmelita does not offer any legal explanation as to how the
Court’s interpretation constitutes a re-write of the settlement agreement.
Instead, Carmelita asks the Court to enforce the “plain meaning” of the Interlocutory
Decree. Reply at Carmelita appears to argue that the Court’s interpretation of the plain meaning of Section II(A)(2) wrong with no explanation to how it is incorrect. Clear error does not exist when litigant merely disagrees with the court. See Smith City of Chester, F.R.D. 95, 97 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
Carmelita explains that “under the plain meaning of the Stipulated Interlocutory Decree, [Carmelita’s property] Defendant’s sole and separate property.” Reply at This still remains true. The Court’s interpretation does not distribute Carmelita’s property. Rather, the loss of the property was due to Carmelita’s own inaction, as explained the Court’s prior order.
l0
Decision and Order DM0554- Cruz
2.
4.
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is
4.
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of
in
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v.
Page 7
if)
.
.
Carmelita demonstrated that Court’s February and Order unjust.
(“Manifest
Cru Cru
As such, the Court finds Carmelita has not sufficiently shown that the Court clearly erred in interpreting Section II(A)(2) of the Interlocutory Decree.
B. has not the 11, 2019 Decision
was manifestly
“Where reconsideration is sought due to manifest injustice, the moving party can only
prevail if it demonstrates that the injustice from the case is ‘apparent to the point of being indisputable.” Shirlington Limousine Transp., Inc. United States, 78 Fed. Cl. 27, (2007); see also Poe. Gas Elec. Co. United Stcttes, 74 Fed. Cl. 779, 785 (2006)
Injustice’ thus refers to injustice that is apparent to the point of bemg almost indisputable.”).
Carmelita argues the Court’s decision was manifestly unjust because it failed to consider and address the fact that Carmelita has lost her property as result of the loan default. Motion at Reply at Supplemental Motion at Carmelita further argues that the Court’s decision was clear error and was manifestly unjust in that it distributed Carmelita’s separate property. Supplemental Motion at & As explained in Sections A and C, the Court does not find that the Court “committed clear error” or that there was “manifest showing of failure to consider material facts presented to the Court.”
Carmelita argues the manifestly unjust result occurred due to Gerard’s “failure to meet his obligation to the 2012 PFC Loan.” Motion at The Court disagrees. While Gerard may have failed to meet his initial obligation, the Court found Gerard made attempts and efforts to secure further financing for the loan. Decision Order at Rather, was Carmelita’s continued refusal, despite ample opportunity, to sign off the necessary documents to obtain further financing which resulted Carmelita’s loss. at 8-9.
“I
Decision and Order DM0554-14,
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has a loan at 2-3.
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fails to see how the did and
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the
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such facts. the
in a &
is no to take
it
the to
to do so.
to sign the
to
the fact that as a
to
the
loan
not
Carmelita argues that while Gerard’s failure pay PFC may have been
willful, Court
property.” Reply
provide remedy
when provided ample opportunity
financing documents seek clarification from both PFC loan officer her counsel but failed
Carmelita argues that the Court failed property and that Gerard longer
Motion Supplemental Motion
consider Carmelita lost her obligation pay for resu]t of default.
The Court contempt motions
not consider these facts, considering
thorough review of
testimony and analysis of arguments of parties. Decision Order
“not provided specific remedy Defendant’s loss of her separate
The Court under party who failed
obligation, nor does have authority, action prevent loss question, especially
Carmelita had ample opportunity
While Court sympathizes with Carmelita’s loss of property inherited from her family, there legal basis support contention that the Court’s finding that Gerard did
not willfully violate injustice that apparent order, Cruz had nothing.” Decision Order
contempt order manifestly unjust. The Court does find point of being almost indisputable. stated Courfs prior
ability stop foreclosure her property, but chose
such, Court finds Carmelita not demonstrated Court’s February 2019 Decision and Order manifestly unjust.
Carmelita has not demonstrated a manifest showing of a failure to consider material facts presented to the Court.
Court
hearings revolved almost entirely The Court engaged
prior
6
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18 19
23
25
26
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and
14, Cruz
Page of
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The Court aware that inability pay loan resulted
foreclosure of
not consider that obligation pay but
Carmelita submitted conclusory allegations that Carmelita lost her property that Gerard longer
Court
provided factual legal analysis support such
Court finds Carmelita not demonstrated manifest showing of failure
consider material presented Court.
Carmelita has not offered any new facts that were not available prior to the Court’s Decision and Order.
motion reconsider based upon emergence of material
change of occurring after the time of such decision.” CVR 7.1(i)(2). Carmelita explains that brings her Motion, pursuant portion of Reply However, after
reviewing testimony from September 2019 hearing, Carmelita failed offer
that were not already testified Further, Carmelita failed explain how
prior hearings. Court Recording
of facts testified hearing emerged after
Court’s February 2019 Decision
that emerge until after court order,
ground.
E. Carmelita’s arguments raised in Section III of the Supplemental Reply are
irrelevant to the Motion for Reconsideration.
proposition.
Order. Absent testimony evidence of motion reconsider
Carmelita asserts that Interlocutory Decree inequity Carmelita. Supplemental Reply Carmelita makes many allegations, pointing instances where
Interlocutory Decree allegedly followed, causing hardship Carmelita.
6
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28
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9 10
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of
1.
Decision and Order DM0554-14,
.
at 5-9. Id. at 7.
is
the
to the
in the did has a loan
the home. the fact
has not
any As such, the
or
to has
a
to D.
facts
to the
she
in part, the
to this 20,
the rule.
at
facts
to at
See
the
11,
new facts on this
the
at 2. has
then
not been
to to
Id. at
A
to
can be
“the
new
facts or a
did not
a
there is no basis for a
to
has
and
no
to
for
law
the
to
(Sept. 20, 2019).
to
any and
the
to at the and
the
has led to gross
to
Paic
a
a
any new
2
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v.
Decision and Order DM0554-14, Cruz Cruz
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to
Id. at 4.
in
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Carmelita then asks the Court “find that the circumstances have resulted gross inequity against Defendant CARMELITA.”
The Court no relevance this gross inequities argument. Carmelita points nothing statute case law which suggests finding of gross inequity basis for motion reconsider. Further, the Court refuses make finding of “gross inequity,” considering this
argument raised for first time Carmelita’ Reply. Carmelita had ample opportunity show significance her initial Motion, her initial Reply, the hearings this matter, her Supplemental Motion. Carmelita failed make such showing.
such, the Court finds Carmelita’s arguments raised Section of the Supplemental Reply irrelevant the present Motion for Reconsideration.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court hereby DENIES Carmelita’s Motion for
Reconsideration.
IT IS SO ORDERED this day of December, 2019.
/4,
HONORABLE ALBERTO LAMORENA III Presiding Judge, Superior Court of Guam
/%ff
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